Roundtable in Astana on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Speech by the Chairman of the Board of the Armenian Association of Political Scientists M. Shahzadeyan

Infrastructure Problems of Armenia and Azerbaijan

in the Context of Geopolitical Transformations.

Dear colleagues! Allow me to welcome you and express my gratitude to the participants and the organizer of this roundtable, the East-West International Center for Geopolitical Forecasting, and personally to the Center's director Karlygash Zhandildinovna Nugmanova for our participation in discussing this highly pressing issue as a part of an important initiative—the "Kazakhstan Dialogue Platform."

Referring to the topic of the roundtable, it is impossible not to note Kazakhstan's position on this type of conflict which President Tokayev recently presented at the VIII-th Congress of Leaders of World Religions assessing the current geopolitical situation: it is characterized, he said, by an increase in the number of various conflicts and military clashes. He called for learning lessons from the past and striving for constructive and open dialogue.

Such a dialogue is certainly important for Armenia and Azerbaijan but its significance extends beyond these two countries. This is evidenced by the fact that the leaders of these countries chose of all places to meet in Washington, D.C. The declaration adopted as a result can be called an agreement of intent. With the exception of the third point which concerns regional infrastructure issues. We are talking about a route, or a corridor which is supposed to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave that has been named the "Trump Path." This point is called a key element of the agreement signed in the White House. It should be noted that since the said declaration is an official international legal document, the Azerbaijani side is obliged to adhere to the established rules. Namely, the said cross-border route runs through the territory of the Republic of Armenia and is called the Syunik region. Therefore, calling this route the "Zangezur corridor" at a high state level is unacceptable! Moreover, Azerbaijan made quite recently territorial claims against Armenia and called most of its territory,including the capital Yerevan “Western Azerbaijan" and the Syunik region “Zangezur”. And to this day, as a result of military aggression it occupies more than 240 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia in close proximity to the Syunik region.

How does this tie in with the following provision of paragraph 5 of the Washington Declaration of 8 August 2025: "We recognize the need to build a future free from conflict, based on the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force." When does Azerbaijan plan to withdraw from the occupied territories?

As the renowned Polish diplomat Andrzej Klimczyk writes in an article on the website of the Armenian Association of Political Scientists, the most important element that could align the interests of the South Caucasus countries is the issue of infrastructure—transport communications, energy and fuel supply systems, etc.

And here, geopolitical and, so to say, geoeconomic issues come to the fore, affecting not only the South Caucasus countries and their neighbors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, but also the collective West, China, India and other countries. In Russia, for example, there are opinions that this is not simply a matter of logistics but a geopolitical game with far-reaching consequences.

Here are some of those issues.

1. The corridor specified in paragraph 3 of the Agreement is not simply a connection between Azerbaijan and its autonomous region but a communications project linking Turkey with Azerbaijan and Central Asia and further on with China, as well as the East with Europe and the Arab countries. How will the implementation of this project impact the functioning of other cross-border communications? Such as, for example, the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Chabahar-Central Asia Corridor and the China-Pakistan Corridor (CPEC, Gwadar). During the talks with the Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin noted that the countries are developing the North-South transport route which is intended to become an important artery connecting the Eurasian region. However, the deal signed on August 8 in Washington could jeopardize the existing plans.

2. The item 4 states that the Republic of Armenia will cooperate with the United States and the other agreed partners to establish a framework for the Trump Route Project (TRIPP) in Armenia. What will be the role and the format of the US presence in this matter, and how will countries such as Iran and Russia respond? Is a confrontational scenario between leading players possible?

3. The threat of this cross-border transport corridor becoming an extraterritorial corridor is being seriously raised. The item 3 of the declaration speaks of ensuring unimpeded communication between the mainland of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. What does this mean? Should Armenia have the right to implement full customs and passport control? If not, how does this fit with the emphasis in the same item on the importance of opening communications between the two countries for domestic, bilateral, and international transport based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction of states?

4. Why is the Baku-Gazakh-Ijevan-Dilijan-Yerevan route, with the subsequent access via Ararat to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region and Turkey not being considered?

5. Will Armenia be able to communicate with its economic partners through Azerbaijan? Will this communication be also unimpeded? After all, this very item speaks, I repeat, about the importance of opening communications between the two countries for domestic, bilateral and international transport as well as mutually beneficial transport routes serving Armenia!

6. Armenia, like Kazakhstan, is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. Will the establishment of any form of American control over the corridor constitute a violation of the EAEU Charter? Will the free movement of goods and services within the EAEU be restricted? Will the customs regime established for EAEU countries be observed? Will this force EAEU members to reconsider their prospects of using this section for transit of their goods? Will Armenia be forced to choose between partnership with the US and EAEU membership?

7. How will the free trade zone between the EAEU and Iran, operating through Armenia, operate?

8. How will the interests of the Russian Federation related to the railway concession and the presence of Russian border guards in the Meghri section be protected?

Today, unfortunately, there are more questions than concrete answers to these and other issues. Perhaps that's why, speaking about this, Sergey Lavrov stated that the initial enthusiastic cries have given way to skepticism.

I n Russia and Iran voices are growing louder that transferring the corridor to US control effectively displaces them from key processes in the South Caucasus. There are even claims that the corridor's management by an American company creates a potential military threat. They also claim that the Syunik Corridor will cut Armenia and Russia off from Iran and that a serious conflict in the region will ensue in the future.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry has explicitly warned against any foreign intervention near its borders which could "undermine the security and long-term stability of the region." Iran considers attempts to change Armenia's territorial integrity a "red line."

This situation is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and the risk of decisions that could lead to a serious conflict or confrontation. The region may become a nerve center for the clash of geopolitical interests between Turkey, Iran, Russia, China and other countries.

So, what should be done? In our view, ensuring the proper interaction between law and politics is essential for resolving cross-border communications issues. Legal issues of cross-border communications and transit regimes have long been an integral part of international law. Let us ask: what should be the legal basis for resolving this problem based on the principles and provisions of current international legal instruments?

The international community has made considerable efforts to establish a solid legal foundation for this issue. Since the mid-20th century the international law has been enriched by documents such as:

• The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (1956),

• The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto, 1973).

• The TIR Convention (1975), which both Armenia and Azerbaijan have signed, simplifies the international transportation of goods from one or more customs offices of departure to one or more customs offices of destination. At the same time, the customs authorities of each country are granted the right to conduct random checks if there is a suspicion of violations.

• The importance of the regulatory framework is also noted in the Alma-Ata Programme of Action (2003).

• In furtherance of the provisions of the Alma-Ata Programme of Action, the UN General Assembly adopted the Vienna Programme of Action on 12 December 2014.

The need to adhere to international legal instruments and bilateral agreements on transport and transit issues is indicated in the 2007 Geneva UN Conference on Trade and Development (p. 22).

All other international documents on the legal regulation of cross-border communications for the transportation of goods and passengers unambiguously recognize the sovereign rights of the transit country and the validity of its jurisdiction, without any mention of their extraterritorial status. This is also stated in paragraph 9 of the Yalta Memorandum on Cooperation between the CIS Member States in the Field of International Transport Corridors of September 18, 2003.

An important aspect of ensuring the security of cross-border routes, namely combating organized crime, should be particularly noted. In September 2024, at the Second Baku Security Forum on "Modern Challenges Aimed at the Security of Global Transport Networks”Ali Nagiyev, Head of the State Security Service of the Azerbaijan Republic, noted the danger of criminal acts on transport routes and emphasized the importance of joint efforts by countries to prevent them. However, it must be understood that without a sound legal framework such work is unlikely to be effective.

It is important to follow the provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which states: "Nothing shall entitle a State Party to exercise in the territory of another State jurisdiction and to exercise functions that are exclusively within the competence of the authorities of that other State in accordance with its domestic law" (Article 4, paragraph 2).

As President Tokayev noted, the current global situation is characterized by rising tensions and a deteriorating global agenda. Today, many actors believe that force solves everything. Therefore, they adhere to a policy of resolving contentious infrastructure issues and projects primarily by force, ignoring the rights and the interests of other actors without soberly considering or forecasting changes in the balance of power, both regionally and more broadly.

In Armenia, both the government and the opposition are proposing a peace agenda that takes into account the provisions of international law and the interests of the peoples of both countries. The authorities and the political elite of Azerbaijan should also abandon the policy of forcibly pushing their agenda.

Taking into account the characteristics of the active phase of the current stage of serious geopolitical transformations, it is unlikely that such attempts will lead to positive results and not only in the long term but also in the medium term. They could lead to a new round of dangerous confrontation. The authorities and the political elite of Azerbaijan should abandon the policy of forcibly pushing their agenda and the attempts to push decisions in an extraterritorial format.

In resolving contentious issues and achieving a fair balance of interests the mediation efforts of countries with which both Armenia and Azerbaijan cooperate can be crucial. Emphasizing the importance of the issue being discussed at the Kazakhstani forum, I would like to once again congratulate our colleagues from Kazakhstan for their efforts in this area.

We hope that the Kazakhstani dialogue platform will help the parties to focus their efforts on resolving problems on a solid legal basis. This will benefit not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also all other interested parties which can also present their perspectives at this forum and, with the assistance of their Kazakhstani colleagues, find optimal solutions.

Mihran Shahzadeyan